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Executive Interview
An Interview with Randy Vataha
Conducted by Daniel A. Rascher and Dennis R. Howard
Randy Vataha grew up in Garden Grove, California,
where he attended Rancho Alamitos High School. He let-
tered in four sports at Rancho and upon graduation
decided to focus on football.
After a year and a half at Golden West Junior College,
where he made the transition from high school quarter-
back to college wide receiver, Randy received a football
and academic scholarship to Stanford University. He was
a starting wide receiver in the 1969 and 1970 seasons. In
his senior year, Stanford won the Pacific 8 championship
and went on to challenge unbeaten Ohio State in the Rose
Bowl. The Stanford team quarterbacked by Jim Plunkett
defeated Ohio State 27-17 and Randy caught the final and
decisive touchdown in the game. Randy went on to com-
plete his academic career at Stanford, receiving a BA
degree in political science in 1972.
In 1971, Randy was the 17th draft choice of the Los
Angeles Rams. After attending training camp and being
released by the Rams, he was picked up by the New
England Patriots and reunited with Plunkett. Randy went
on to play with the Patriots for six years and finished his
career with the Green Bay Packers in 1977. In 1974,
Randy was elected the player representative for the New
England Patriots to the NFL Players Association. He
became a leader in the Association and served on the
Executive Committee for Collective Bargaining.
Randy entered the world of business in 1977 when he
started the Playoff Sports and Fitness Clubs, and expand-
ed the company to 10 facilities by 1981, all located in New
England and New York.
In 1981 Randy attended the founding meeting of the
United States Football League and helped give birth to
the USFL. He became co-owner of the Boston Breakers
Football Club, which played its inaugural season at
Boston University’s Nickerson Field in 1983. The team
was moved to the New Orleans Superdome for the sec-
ond season since a stadium of adequate size was not avail-
able long-term in downtown Boston. Randy served as
president of the New Orleans Breakers in 1984.
Ultimately, the team was sold to new ownership that
moved the Breakers to Portland, Oregon, when the USFL
decided to change its spring schedule to the fall.
After returning to Boston in late 1984, Randy became a
partner and vice president in the world’s largest executive
search firm at that time, Korn-Ferry International. While
doing a search for Bob Woolf Associates Inc., a sports
agency that represented athletes and entertainers in con-
tract negotiations, Randy’s long-time friend and compa-
ny founder, Bob Woolf, asked him to consider taking the
position of Chief Executive Officer. Randy agreed and
became CEO of Bob Woolf Associates Inc. in March of
1986. Randy negotiated major contracts and oversaw the
daily operation of the company, which represented a vir-
tual “Who’s Who” roster of sports and entertainment
superstars including Larry Bird, Tom Glavine, Joe
Montana, The New Kids on the Block, and Larry King.
In 1994, Randy, along with his partner Robert L.
Caporale, formed Game Plan LLC. Game Plan provides
consulting and investment banking services to the sport
and entertainment industry. The company’s primary
function is to represent professional sports teams or
potential owners of professional teams in their acquisi-
tion, sale, financing, and/or capitalization. Some of Game
Plan’s transactions include the purchase of the Boston
Celtics in 2002, the sale of the Ottawa Senators in
September of 2003, the purchase of the Los Angeles
Dodgers in 2004, and currently handling the sale of the
St. Louis Blues. Game Plan has also been very active in
minor league baseball, including raising $40 million of
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new capital for Mandalay Baseball Holdings, which owns
five minor league baseball franchises.
Randy is probably the only person in the United States
who has been a professional player, sports union negotia-
tor, team president, owner, sports agent, and sports
investment banker.
He is married to the former Deborah Ayn Young of
Garden Grove, California, and is the father of three chil-
dren, Collin, Kyle, and Courtney.
Role and Trends
Q: What are the essential skills needed for your job?
A: First you need all of the fundamental financial skills
and knowledge base that any traditional investment
banker would possess. Second is a working knowledge of
the professional sports team business. This includes such
items as a complete understanding of the collective bar-
gaining agreements with the various players associations,
the inner workings of the leagues and how they interact
and affect franchise operations, the future development of
revenue sources such as international expansion and/or
league owned media outlets and distribution, etc. Third,
given professional sports is a very small industry and
everyone knows everyone, you must have the ability to
develop and maintain relationships with owners and sen-
ior league executives regardless of what side you are on in
any particular transaction. This is really based on your
ability to develop a reputation for being highly ethical and
competent while dealing in a world that does not neces-
sarily follow traditional financial structures or valuations.
Q: What are the recent trends in sports investment
banking?
A: The primary trend is tied to the sources of capital for
professional sports teams. There are an increasing num-
ber of equity funds and hedge funds looking seriously at
professional sports both on the debt and the equity side.
Now that all four major sports leagues have a salary cap,
or in the case of Major League Baseball, debt service rules,
these funds can better analyze the risks associated with
investing or providing debt to professional sports fran-
chises. Given a steady increase in the value of these teams,
a new source of capital is generally welcomed. 
With this new pool of capital has come greater creativ-
ity in the capital structure of franchises. Given that each
league has its formal and informal limitations on secured
debt on franchises, new capital sources are utilizing more
complicated capital structures including preferred equity
or debt, mezzanine debt, and holding company struc-
tures to create more value for their invested capital.
Given the historical increase in franchise values and cur-
rent franchise values, new capital sources have become a
critical part of providing future financial fuel to sustain
the growth in franchise values.
Q: What will we see in the near future in sports investment
banking? What changes do you see with respect to fran-
chise financing?
A: As stated above, I think the increasing involvement of
equity funds and hedge funds will continue to change
franchise financing. In addition, the more traditional
banks that have sports lending specialties will continue to
transition into more creative financing structures to
remain competitive. Also, we are starting to see more tra-
ditional debt sources that have historically avoided pro-
fessional sports, given the past risk and volatility, creating
small sports specialty practices that are aggressively purs-
ing various sports team and related financings. 
Q: What sports have the most growth going forward (e.g.,
in terms of revenues and franchise values)?
A: At the franchise level, the NHL has the best opportuni-
ty to increase its average franchise value on a percentage
basis over the next few years given its new collective bar-
gaining agreement. Adding a hard salary cap and revenue
sharing to a league that has sustained significant financial
difficulties over the last 10 years should dramatically
increase its franchise values in the short term. Long-term
value will be determined more by the NHL’s ability to sig-
nificantly expand national media revenues and other
potential league endeavors such as European expansion.
At the league level, the NFL Network is a sleeping giant
that is waking up. This season the NFL Network will carry
live regular season NFL games on Thursday nights and
selected Saturdays. This will motivate the various nation-
al cable systems that are not currently carrying the NFL
Network to do so. The result would be a national sports
network with a subscriber base comparable to ESPN and
the potential to be a major competitor to ESPN. 
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Major League Baseball has seen great success to date
with Major League Baseball Advanced Media (“BAM”)
which shows substantial potential for future growth in
revenue and value for MLB team owners. 
Q: What are the challenges, benefits, and issues involved
in running a boutique investment bank focused on sports?
A: The challenge in running a specialized investment bank
in the sports industry occurred in the early years when we
were trying to educate potential clients to the benefits of
working with a group that only dealt in professional
sports. Since we are generally involved with very success-
ful businessmen that often have significant relationships
at major investment banks, it took a lot of development
time and some very successful transactions to demon-
strate to the marketplace that Game Plan has a unique
ability within the sports industry to get things done. 
The benefit of operating Game Plan is that we are doing
what we love. Many very successful people come to us
saying they are tired of their current business and since
they are huge sports fans, they want to know how to tran-
sition their business skills into an industry that they per-
ceive they would really enjoy, i.e., sports. We are
fortunate to be there already and in those trying
moments that always occur in any transaction, we remain
grateful that we are where we are.
The main issue we have in running Game Plan is select-
ing the right mix of projects to be involved with. We have
been extremely careful to never extend ourselves to a
point that it would inhibit our ability to provide the best
possible service for any client. There is always that temp-
tation to add that additional project given the revenue it
would generate, but we have learned over the years what
our capacity is and never exceed it.
Examples
Q: Please take us inside a deal, such as your work involv-
ing the purchase of the NHL. What were the key elements?
How did you choose your price? What prevented it from
being accepted?
A: Between my partner Bob Caporale and myself, we have
been involved in every aspect of the professional sports
industry. For many years, Bob was a practicing attorney
with a very successful sports and entertainment legal
practice, primarily representing professional sports
teams. We both owned and operated our own team in the
old United States Football League. In addition to owning
a team, I have a somewhat unique background having
been a player in the NFL, a member of the Executive
Committee in the NFL Players Association, including
involvement in negotiating collective bargaining agree-
ments, and an agent with Bob Woolf negotiating
player/entertainer contracts for people like Joe Montana,
Larry Bird, Tom Glavine, and Larry King on CNN. 
Over the 60 years of combined sports industry experi-
ence, Bob and I have developed several ideas about how
to maximize the value of sports teams and leagues. As we
observed the difficulties that the NHL was experiencing
financially prior to their new CBA, we focused our atten-
tion on that league. We concluded that the NHL was a
clear candidate for a single entity structure with the
League (single company) owning all of the franchises.
Most people immediately assume that this was based on
creating a way to dramatically decrease player costs.
Nothing could be farther from the truth. Certainly, play-
er costs had become far too high, 75% of the NHL’s gross
revenue, but we assumed that this would be addressed in
collective bargaining whether or not we owned the teams.
Where we saw the opportunity was beyond just player
cost reduction. On the expense side we believed there
were significant reductions that could be achieved in the
cost of operating each franchise as part of a single entity.
For example, increasing the league-wide scouting pro-
gram, of which the cost is shared by 30 teams while sig-
nificantly reducing the duplication at the team level for
scouting costs. The result was a very significant savings
overall without hurting the product in any way. On the
revenue side there were opportunities such as eliminating
the exclusive local media territorial rights that each NHL
franchise holds and negotiating all media contracts, local
and national, at the League level. This would eliminate a
franchise’s right to block the showing of other NHL
games in its territory even if it generated more overall
revenue for all of the teams. 
Based on these and many other innovative principals,
we developed a full business plan for the acquisition of all
30 NHL teams. We then approached our first equity
source, Bain Capital, with the goal of raising about 30%
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of the capital we projected would be necessary. After
reviewing the plan, Bain agreed to provide all of the equi-
ty necessary to acquire the NHL. We then approached a
traditional sports bank lender for the debt component
and they agreed to provide the debt. In aggregate we
raised about $4.5 billion. 
We determined the price based on the business plan for
the operations of all 30 teams. Once fully vetted with our
equity and debt partners, we balanced the projected IRR
equity return with the risk factors associated with the
plan. This resulted in a final offer in excess of $4.2 billion,
or an average around $140 million per team. Obviously,
this price would be scaled based on each team’s financial
performance, market size, etc.
It is our feeling that the deal was not accepted primari-
ly due to the condition we imposed that all 30 teams must
agree to sell or there was no deal. Apparently some own-
ers decided not to sell at virtually any price because they
enjoyed owing their franchise and their primary motiva-
tion was not financial. However, this might have changed
had the collective bargaining agreement not been settled. 
Q: What were the key elements in your work involving the
purchase of the L.A. Dodgers?
A: The acquisition of the Los Angeles Dodgers was both
the most challenging and rewarding project we have
worked on from a financial perspective. Our relationship
with Frank McCourt started when he retained us in
regards to his bid for the Boston Red Sox. We quickly
learned how bright, determined, and creative Frank was.
Although we did not win that bid, it was clear that the
Red Sox process had opened Frank’s eyes to the value and
rewards of owning a Major League Baseball team. After
the Red Sox sale, Frank asked us which MLB franchise
that was either for sale or might be for sale would we go
after. Our immediate response was the L.A. Dodgers.
Eventually the team became available. However, the sale
process started slowly because the franchise had lost an
average of $42 million a year for three straight years and
the owner, FOX, wanted a price between $350 and $450
million. Frank started his quest to buy the Dodgers in the
summer of 2003 in spite of the team’s financial perform-
ance to date. Frank agreed with us on the underlying
value of the franchise based on the following:
• The Dodgers are one of the premier franchises in all
of professional sports with a great tradition on and
off the field.
• They are in downtown Los Angeles, which is the sec-
ond largest market in the US.
• Their fan base is incredibly stable. Since opening
Dodger Stadium in 1962, the Dodgers have drawn
more fans that any other MLB team. Over the last 10
years, they are the only MLB team to exceed three
million in attendance for all 10 years, with the
Yankees and Cardinals second, exceeding that mark
seven of 10 years.
• The franchise included Dodger Stadium and the
nearly 300 acres of prime real estate surrounding it.
• Their local television contract was undervalued since
FOX owned the team and the team’s local TV con-
tracts were with FOX owned companies. 
• We believed that the losses could be eliminated with
a different approach to managing the franchise while
producing a better on-field product.
The key problem was to develop a capital structure to
be able to pay FOX’s price while properly financing the
acquisition of a franchise that had suffered such severe
losses. We faced three major problems with the acquisi-
tion, 1) procuring enough debt to make the transaction
work at FOX’s price, 2) meeting MLB’s “Debt Service
Rules,” which significantly restricts the amount of
secured debt a franchise can have, and 3) convincing
everyone that the franchise would be quickly turned
around financially. 
Ultimately, we overcame all of these issues by focusing
on a carefully developed business plan and presentation
that was built around all of the positive factors listed
above. We received great cooperation from MLB, and
FOX worked tirelessly with Frank and our team to com-
plete the transaction. 
Details
Q: What are your thoughts on the merits of the following
franchise valuation methods: price/revenue, price/earn-
ings ratio, or discounted cash flow method?
A: Of the three mentioned, only the price/revenue method
has any real value in professional sports since many teams
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have negative earnings and cash flow. However, the price
revenue methodology looks only backwards and is gener-
ally a scale that only applies to teams sold over a finite
period, usually five years. The result is generally a very
wide-value range. For example, 2 to 3.5 times revenue
range would not be uncommon utilizing this method, so
if revenues were $100 million, your range would be from
$200 to $350 million. We would not find that particularly
helpful in valuing a team. Many other factors must be
analyzed before determining a team’s value. Gross rev-
enues is certainly one of them but comparable sales, the
market size, stadium/arena deal, portability of the fran-
chise, local media contracts, quality of the team, commit-
ted long-term player and other contracts, etc. all have a
significant impact on franchise values. 
Q: In general, what are your bases for determining the
controlling interest premium for a sports entity and how
does this differ, if at all, from non-sports entities?
A: Most partnership agreements today, that include
minority investors, usually have some type of tag-along-
rights provision to protect the minority investors from
the controlling partner selling just the controlling interest
at a premium and forcing the minority partners to
remain in place. Absent such provisions, a controlling
interest partner could sell control of a franchise at a sig-
nificant premium given the typical benefits that are
included in the controlling interest, i.e., management
fees, operational control, notoriety, etc. Given the wide
variance of these benefits from team to team, it is impos-
sible to put a general value on the control premium in
sports. In non-sports businesses, the control premium is
generally a function of operational control and does not
include the notoriety factor that can add significant value
to the control premium of a professional sports team.
Q: Why are there not more publicly traded professional
sports franchises, given that there is likely to be a built-in
fan base of potential stock purchasers?
A: First, the NFL does not allow them. The other three
leagues do but with restrictions. The Boston Celtics
(NBA), Cleveland Indians (MLB), and Florida Panthers
(NHL) are examples in each league that were publicly
traded for some period of time. The trend has gone the
other way with all three of these being taken private and
teams that were owned by public companies such as
Disney and AOL Time Warner have been sold or are in
the process of being sold. Even though it is likely that
many fans would purchase stock in their favorite team
not expecting any financial return, over time, dealing
with the SEC requirements and filings is very time con-
suming and a major distraction for professional teams.
More importantly, there has been an active market for
team sales or the sale of ownership interests in teams, so
there is liquidity and a constant pool of capital available
to team owners without the complications of operating a
public company.
Q: Do you see any minor sports franchises perhaps issuing
equity using direct public offerings (DPO), as opposed to
the more expensive IPO?
A: This may happen in an isolated case or two but we do
not think that there will be any trend in this direction.
Various ownership requirements in minor league base-
ball reduce the likelihood of this as a significant capital
source.
Future
Q: What are some of the big unanswered questions in
sports finance that you wish you had answers to?
A: Since all transactions must be approved by their
respective leagues and there are significant debt restric-
tions and equity requirements, most of the major finan-
cial issues have enough history to be understood by
experienced sports investment bankers. 
One major question will be the impact of increased and
enhanced revenue sharing in the leagues. The NHL added
revenue sharing for the first time as a component in its
new CBA; the NFL just increased its already substantial
revenue sharing program in its CBA extension; and MLB
is already suggesting that the League would like to
increase the level of revenue sharing in its CBA negotia-
tions at the end of the 2006 season. In addition, there are
always evolving questions like the future value of the NFL
Network, the ultimate impact of the new CBA on NHL
franchise values, the future value of Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, or the battle over team con-
trolled Regional Sports Networks (RSN) versus the inde-
pendent RSNs. 
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Q: Similarly, what are the most critical research needs in
the area of sport finance? What are the unanswered ques-
tions and what type of empirical support or data would be
most valuable?
A: A better understanding of why franchises are financial-
ly successful and what are the critical drivers on both the
revenue and expense side that produce those results. It is
far too simple to assume that winning teams are also suc-
cessful financially. The question of cause and effect
becomes very important. If you assume that a winning
team is the cause with the effect being financial success,
then you are dooming 50% of your league’s franchises to
financial failure (that half that does not have a winning
team). Correlating and analyzing such data as the team’s
market size, team performance, stadium/arena deal,
management, player costs, etc., in a standard format and
ranking system that would allow a much better under-
standing of what are the real factors in a franchise’s finan-
cial success would be a very valuable exercise. 
To accomplish this, you would first need accurate data
as to which teams have been profitable historically and
which teams have not. You would also need to develop a
complete list of those factors that could impact a team’s
financial operations and have access to data for each fac-
tor for each franchise. Once this data has been assembled,
a matrix could be developed that would rank and com-
pare the various factors and their ultimate impact on
financial success. This analysis would be extremely useful
for current owners, prospective team buyers, and league
offices in their effort to assist their franchises in creating
financially successful teams.
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